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The April 14, 1986 Bombing of Libya: Act of
Self-Defense or Reprisal?
Jeffrey Allen McCredie*
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 14, 1986, United States Air Force F-111's and Navy 15 A-6
and A-7 fighter planes launched a strategic bombardment of five
targets in Libya.' The strikes centered at designated areas in Tripoli,2
and Benghazi.3 An estimated thirty-seven Libyans, including civilians,
were killed; ninety-three sustained injuries.' The strikes were preceded
by numerous conflict-oriented events allegedly linked to Libya which oc-
curred in the past four months. On December 27, 1985, terrorists at-
tacked passengers at Rome and Vienna airports killing twenty, including
four terrorists.' President Reagan accused Libya of being involved.'
Subsequent to the airport attacks, the United States advocated economic
sanctions against Libya and ordered United States citizens in Libya to
return home.7 Conflict and tensions mounted between the United States
and Libya when on March 24 and 25, 1986, Libyan missiles and ships
attacked the U.S. Sixth Fleet while it was engaging in naval exercises in
the Gulf of Sidra.8 Libyan leader Mohammad Qadhafi avowed that no
nation may legitimately pass through the "Line of Death," an arbitrarily
created line drawn from the northern most point of Libyan land across
* Jeffrey Allan McCredie, Assistant District Attorney, Narcotics Enforcement Team, Mont-
gomery County, Pa., B.A. Eastern Baptist College 1981, Fulbright Scholar University of Hamburg,
West Germany 1981-82, J.D. Temple University School of Law 1985.
1 Gorden, Pentagon Details 2-Pronged Attack, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, at Al, col. 5.
2 Id. at Al, col. 3. The attacks at Tripoli aimed at three areas; the E1-Assiziya Barracks, a
military airport, and Sidi Bilal.
3 In Benghazi, the Jamahiriya barracks and the Benina Air base were the principle targets.
4 Whitaker, A New Kind of War, Newsweek, Apr. 25, 1986, at 17.
5 Wall St. J., Apr. 16, 1986, at B18, col. 4.
6 Id. at B18, col. 3. The United States contended that Libya was a base for the Abu Nidal
terrorist group, which allegedly orchestrated the Rome and Vienna massacres. Wash. Post, Jan. 16,
1986, at Al, col. 6.
7 Wall St. J., Apr. 16, 1986, at B18, col. 4.
8 Id. After Libya fired surface-to-air missiles at several United States war planes in the exer-
cises, the United States sunk two Libyan patrol boats, including other exchanges of fire in "Opera-
tion Prairie Fire." See Newsweek, Apr. 7, 1986, at 24.
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the Gulf of Sidra.9
Several days after the exchanges of fire in the Gulf of Sidra, on April
5, 1986 the "LaBelle" nightclub, a location in Berlin, West Germany
frequented by American military personnel, was bombed.1" One Ameri-
can was killed and an estimated sixty-three Americans were injured."1
Prior to the April 14, 1986, air strikes, the United States made
known its intent to use military force against terroristic bases. 2 The
United States also announced its finding of "incontrovertible evidence"
linking Libya to the Berlin bombing. 3 Intelligence sources also linked
Libya to other recent incidents of international terrorism," including
plans to attack American diplomats. 5
After the strikes, President Reagan announced his decision to order
the bombardment as retaliation for the direct Libyan role in the Berlin
9 Newsweek, Apr. 7, 1980, at 20.
10 Wall St. J., supra, note 6, at 18, col. 3.
11 Id. Prior to the bombing of the nightclub in Berlin, on April 2, 1986, a bomb exploded in
the passenger cabin of a TWA jet flying over Greece. Four Americans were killed. The United
States Fleet in the Mediterranean remained on alert as Libyan officials ordered Westerners to move
into Army camps, anticipating a possible raid. The Berlin bombing also took the life of another
national, and the total dead were two, and injured over two hundred. Wash. Post, Apr. 5, 1986, at 1,
col. 5.
12 N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 6. See, Wash. Post, Jan. 26, 1986, at A25, col. 1.
13 Weinraub, Officials Say U.S. Warned of Bomb, Minutes Too Late, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11,
1986, at Al, col. 6. U.S. Intelligence revealed a March 25, 1986 cable from Tripoli to the Libyan
People's Bureau in East Berlin regarding the bombing. On April 4, 1986, a report from East Berlin
came back to Tripoli that the bombing may take place the next day. Wash. Post, Apr. 15, 1986, at
A23, col. 1. Walters, Security Council Considers U.S. Self-Defense Exercise, 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 19
(1986).
14 Wall St. J., supra note 6, at 19, col. 3. Intelligence sources were quoted as linking Libya to
the following incidents: April 13, 1985, bombing of the Bank Leumi in Paris, the June 19, 1985
Frankfort West Germany airport bombing, the car bombing at the U.S. Rhein Main Air Force Base
on August 8, 1985 and the October 1985 hostage-taking on the Achille Lauro cruise liner. The role
of Libya, however, was undefined. See also Norland, Inside Terror, Inc., Newsweek, Apr. 7, 1986, at
25.
Furthermore, other intelligence evidence linked Libya with the following incidents. In March
1986, Turkish police arrested two individuals for alleged plots in Turkey against Americans. On
March 28, 1986, France expelled two members of the Libyan People's Bureau in Paris for suspected
involvement in terrorism.
Six days later, France expelled two "Fatah Force 17" members recruited by Libya to attack
United States citizens in Paris.
Finally, at the time that the air strikes were launched, the United States claimed that evidence
existed that the Libyan People's Bureau was planning an attack in Vienna on April 17th. Walters,
supra note 13, at 20.
15 Wash. Post, Apr. 5, 1986, at 1, col. 5. Intelligence sources indicated Libyan surveillance of
United States diplomats in various European locations. Gwertzman, Plots on Global Scale Charged,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, at Al, col. 3. (for intelligence indications of a "global plot" by Libya).
N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1986, at A18, col. 1 (involving a failed plot in Paris of Libyans to kill Ameri-
cans at the U.S. visa office).
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bombing on April 5, 1986.16 The U.S. Ambassador to the United Na-
tions, Vernon A. Walters, while addressing the U.N., called the attacks
acts of self-defense. 17 Prior to the strikes, in January 1986, Secretary of
State George P. Shultz also claimed that the United States had a legal
right to use military force to combat terrorism, under the theory of self-
defense.18 This viewpoint has been criticized from within the United
States19 and from without.20
With the number of state-sponsored terrorist incidents on the rise,
and the declarations by certain nation's leaders to employ state-spon-
sored terroristic tactics,21 the United States and her allies currently face
the dilemma of employing forcible means to preempt future attacks. The
decision to use military force against Libya, as well as other military re-
sponses such as in the October 1985 Achille Lauro incident,22 and the
September 1986 deployment of U.S. special forces to Pakistan,23 marks a
new trend in United States' responses to international terrorism. This
article discusses the actions of the United States against Libya under two
theories of international law- self-defense and reprisal. Particular focus
will be made on the action under The United Nation's Charter, as well as
prior customary international law. The article will attempt to classify
the actions and evaluate the viability of military responses to state-spon-
sored terrorism under international law. Finally, the article will offer
potential methods of reviewing the use of force against terrorism by the
international community as a whole.
16 N.Y. Times, supra note 1, at Al, cols. 3, 6.
17 Sciolino, U.S. Defends Raid Before UN. Body, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1986, at A17, col. 6.
See Walters, supra note 13, at 1-20.
18 Wash. Post, Jan. 26, 1986, at A25, col. 6.
19 Id. at A25, col. 2. In response to Secretary Shultz's January comments, noted international
legal scholars such as Professor Alfred P. Rubin claimed Shultz was in error. Professor John F.
Murphy contended that preemptive strikes, if legal, must require a clear-cut case against the identity
of the terrorists.
In direct response to the U.S. aerial strikes on Libya, former Chief Legal Counsel to the United
Nations, Professor Oscar Schachter, asserted that the United States would have to establish that the
actions were not a punitive reprisal, but were necessary and proportionate. Wash. Post, Apr. 15,
1986, at 20, col. 3.
20 As usual, Europe, was full of mixed views, the majority opposed to the U.S. action. Europe
generally feared a great backlash of retaliation from Libya. Wall St. J., Apr. 16, 1986, at 8, col. I.
France refused to give over flight rights to the F-111 bombers which took off from Britain. See Wall
St. J., Apr. 15, 1986, at 1, col. 3. India and China condemned the attacks as well. See N.Y. Times,
Apr. 16, 1986, at A16, col. 4. See also, Newsweek, Apr. 28, 1986, at 34.
21 Wash. Post, Jan. 16, 1986, at Al, col. 1 (where Colonel Qadhafi averred that he will train
and equip Arab guerrillas for terrorist missions). Walters supra note 13, at 20.
22 N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
23 N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1986, at Al, col. 6 (where reports indicated that the United States
"Delta Force" embarked to assist Pakistani commandos, but never was actually employed).
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II. STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM PAST AND PRESENT, AND
EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A RESOLUTION
International terrorism appears in many forms, primarily in the cat-
egories of private terrorism, terrorism in civil war, and state-sponsored
terrorism.2" This article focuses only on state-sponsored terrorism. Ter-
rorism, in the generic sense, is difficult to define.25 For the purpose of
this article, I define international terrorism as the "threat or use of vio-
lence by individuals or groups, including but not limited to bombings,
hijacking, hostage takings, directed at indiscriminant international
targets, intending to shock, stun, or create chaos among the international
community.26 State-sponsored terrorism includes acts by a government
against its own population,27 but for the purposes of this article, the focus
will be made on a state which supports international terror by financing
terrorist groups, or allowing their territory to be used for training, or
aiding and abetting terrorism in general.2"
There is no dispute that incidents related to state-sponsored terror-
ism are steadily on the rise.29 In this rise, Libya is one of the major
contributors.3 ° Libya not only openly admits the use of international ter-
rorism,3' but avers to bring chaos to the Western Hemisphere.32
Terrorism has burdened the world community for many years, but
has been particularly prominent in the 1970s and 1980s as a form of
violence. Despite enormous concern over the problem, the world com-
munity currently cannot agree on a mode or means of controlling inter-
national terrorism.33 Even though a number of countries in the world
community have previously balked at the question of the legality of ter-
24 McCredie, The Responsibility of Statesfor Private Acts of International Terrorism, 1 TEMP.
INT'L & COMP. LAW J. 70 (1985).
25 Gordon, supra note 1.
26 Murphy, Summary Report of the American Bar Association National Conference of Law in
Relationship to Terrorism, in 9 TERRORISM: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 8 (1987).
27 Schestack, Of Private and State Terror-Some Preliminary Observations, 13 RUTGERS L.J.
460 (1982). See also Murphy, The Soviet Union and International Terrorism, 16 INT'L LAW 139
(1982).
28 Schestack, supra note 27, at 460. The scope of state sponsored terror includes any effort by
states to support international terror within or without their borders. It may include indirect in-
volvement as well as the actual furnishing of men and weaponry, including ordering attacks.
29 Murphy, supra note 26, at 4 (which particularly noted the rise in terrorist attacks against
Americans). See also, Sayre, Combatting Terrorism: American Policy and Organization in 4 TER-
RORISM, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND WORLD ORDER, 481 (1984) [hereinafter T.P.V.W.O.].
30 Murphy, supra, note 26.
31 Id. at 26. See Walters, supra note 13, at 20.
32 Murphy, supra note 26, at 27. Walters, supra note 13, at 20.
33 Friedlander, The Enforcement of International Criminal Law: Fact or Fiction, 17 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 88 (1984). See Murphy, Legal Controls and Deterrence of Terrorism: Performance
and Prospects, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 465 (1982).
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rorism,34 there is a general world consensus that states involved with
supporting terrorist activities engage in illegal activity and are interna-
tionally responsible for their acts.35
Yet despite numerous international efforts to create a legal frame-
work whereby terrorist acts can be adjudicated,36 these efforts in many
circumstances have proven ineffective to deal with states who flagrantly
ignore the concept of international law.37 Therefore, in recent months,
the United States has promulgated a policy which includes the option to
use military force to respond to international terrorism. The policy is
primarily due to the lack of effective international legal enforcement ma-
chinery.3s The use of military force against terrorists creates numerous
problems under the United Nations Charter, and blurs the traditional
distinction between war/peace and civilians/soldiers, 39 in that interna-
tional terrorism has been previously termed a "form of warfare."''
The lack of previous success in developing countermeasures against
terrorism has always centered around problems in international jurisdic-
tions, intelligence gathering, the definition of acceptable concessions, and
most 'importantly, the concept of the use of force.4 ' The following sec-
tions outline briefly the previous international legislative efforts of the
world community against terrorism, and why the use of force becomes an
inescapable option.
34 To this day, there are still countries, particularly in the third world, that believe terrorism is
a valid method to effectuate national liberation or political goals. However, scholars such as Profes-
sor Whiteman contend that international terrorism is proscribed by jus cogens. Whiteman, Jus
Cogens In International Law, With a Projected List, 7 GA. J.INT'L & COMP. L. 609 (1977). Despite
the previous disputes over the legal status of terrorism, a most positive step was undertaken by the
United Nations in December of 1985 when the General Assembly by declaration, condemned states
who support terrorism as violating international law. G.A. Res. 61, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. 1985.
35 See McCredie, supra note 24. See also Lillich and Paxman, State Responsibility for Injuries
to Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist Activities, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 217 (1977).
36 See supra notes 42-82 and accompanying text.
37 Rubin, Current Legal Approaches to International Terrorism, in 7 TERRORISM: AN INTER-
NATIONAL JOURNAL 147 (1984). See Friedlander, Terrorism and International Law: Recent Devel-
opments 13 RUrGERS L.J. 493 (1982).
38 Almond, Limits and Possibilities of International Regulation of Terrorism, in T.P.V.W.O.
supra note 29, at 493 (1984). See Evans, American Policy Response to International Terror Problems
of Deterrence in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD - (Livingston ed.
1978) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.)
39 Defense and Technology, June 1986, at 6.
40 O'Ballance, Terrorism: The New Growth Forum of Warfare, in INTERNATIONAL TERROR-
ISM, supra note 38, at 420.
41 But see Defense and Technology, supra note 39, at 6.
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A. Previous International Legislative and Diplomatic Efforts to
Combat Terrorism
1. United Nations' Efforts
The United Nations has technically been aware of the problems of
terrorism since the League of Nations preceded the Charter.42 In the
1960s and early 1970s, the United Nations sponsored three multilateral
aircraft hijacking conventions, limited only to aircraft situations.43 In
1973, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents
was promulgated.' This Convention applies primarily to protecting
heads of states and diplomats.
In 1979, the United Nations responded to the 1976 Entebbe inci-
dent,4 6 by creating a Hostage Convention.47  This Convention delegi-
timizes hostage takings and calls for international cooperation in
prevention and prosecution of international hostage incidents.48
In addition to the enumerated conventions, the United Nations'
General Assembly Resolution 38/130 attempted to broaden the scope of
state responsibility for acts of terrorism. 9 And, in December 1985, the
General Assembly finally agreed to condemn all acts of terrorism, espe-
cially those supported by states, as illegal under international law.5 °
42 Zlataric, History of International Terrorism and its Legal Control, in INTERNATIONAL TER-
RORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES 482 (Bassiouni ed. 1975).
43 Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Con-
vention), Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641,
T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 10 I.L.M. 133 (1970); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention), Sept. 23, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No.
7570, 10 I.L.M. 1115 (1971).
44 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, G.A. Res.
3166, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 146, U.N. Doe. A/9030 (1974).
45 Id. at art. 2.
46 On June 24, 1976, Air Force Flight 139 from Tel Aviv to Paris was hijacked by individuals
of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. On July 3, Israel conducted a military rescue
raid. N.Y. Times, July 11, 1976, at Al, col. 4.
47 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 7, 1979, G.A. Res 34/146,
34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 245-47, U.N. Doc. A/34/36.
48 Murphy, The United Nations and International Terrorism, in 7 TERRORISM; AN INTERNA-
TIONAL JOURNAL 607 (1984-85).
49 Measures to Prevent International Terrorism which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human
Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms and Study of the Underlying Causes of These Forms of
Terrorism and Acts of Violence Which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and
Which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives Including Their Own in an Attempt to Effect
Radical Changes, G.A. Res. 38/130, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47) at 266-67, U.N. Doc. A/38/47
(1984).
50 Murphy, supra note 26, at 28; The U.N. "equivocally condemned as criminal all acts, meth-
ods and practices of terrorism whenever and by whoever committed." N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1986, at
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Despite the overwhelming existence of legislation primarily designed
to deal with specific types of terroristic incidents, the general impact of
the work of the United Nations has gone unfulfilled.51 The Conventions
tend to be limited in scope to specific incidents or diplomatic persons,
and situations such as the bombing of the Berlin nightclub are not always
covered. Another notable problem is that of enforcement. Today there
is largely no effective way to enforce the legal norms created by the
United Nations through the United Nations. Where nations as a matter
of sovereignty ignore directives from the United Nations, every individ-
ual nation must seek domestic means to promote the laws which attempt
to prevent terroristic actions. The next section outlines the efforts re-
gional areas have undertaken to remedy international terrorism.
2. Other World Efforts to Peacefully Combat Terrorism
The Organization of American States "O.A.S." in 1971 promoted
the Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the
Forms of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of In-
ternational Significance.52 The Convention requires states to cooperate
in preventing and punishing acts of terrorism, especially kidnapping,
murder and assaults against "those persons to whom the state has the
duty according to international law to give special protection."53 The
Convention only applies to diplomatic, consular, and civil servants.5 4
In 1976 Europe promoted a Convention on the Suppression of Ter-
rorism."5 The scope of this Convention is broader than the O.A.S. Con-
vention, including stricter provisions on the obligation to extradite and
prosecute terrorists. 6 Subsequent to the European Convention, the
Dublin Agreement of 1979 attempted to strengthen judicial cooperation
among European states.57
In addition to promulgating conventions and mutual agreements,
regional areas such as Europe have consistently met and conferred at
3, col. 3. The U.N. also deplored the killing of innocent people due to terrorism. See N.Y. Times,
Dec. 10, 1986, at A4, col. 3.
51 Murphy, supra note 29, at 603; See McWhinney, International Terrorism: United Nations
Projects for Legal Controls, in 7 TERRORISM: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 175 (1984-85).
52 Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Forms of Crimes
Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T.
3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413, O.A.S.T.S. No. 37, at 6, Org. of Amer. States Off. doc. OEA/Ser. A/17.
53 Id. at art. 1.
54 1 THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 323 (F. Garcia-Amador 1983).
55 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Oct. 25, 1978, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 93 (Cmd. 7390) Europ. T.S. No. 90, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976).
56 Id. at arts. 7, 8, and 13(1).
57 Agreement Concerning Application of the European Convention to the Suppression of Ter-
rorism, European Community, 12 Bull. Eur. Comm. 90 (1979) reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 325 (1980).
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economic summits, and issued nonbinding declarations. 8 On May 5,
1986, in Tokyo, seven countries issued a summit statement, particularly
focusing on Libya's renowned sponsorship of terrorism. 9 The statement
called for refusal to export arms to states who sponsor terrorism, limits
on diplomatic missions, stricter entry/exit requirements for foreigners,
improved extradition procedures, and general cooperation in the appre-
hension and prosecution of terrorists. 60 This statement was subsequently
adhered to in practice by several European and non-European nations.
In August, 1986, West Germany recently arrested a suspect in the Octo-
ber, 1985, Achille Lauro incident,61 an Italian jury convicted 11 of 15
suspects in the Achille Lauro incident,62 and in September, 1986 Paki-
stan President Zia vowed to seek the death penalty in prosecuting any
individuals found to have assisted in the September, 1986, hijacking inci-
dent.63 Finally, in late September, the European Economic Community
agreed to increase sharing of police intelligence information and consoli-
date policies on negotiation.' 4
3. United States Efforts
In addition to being active in supporting the aforementioned United
Nations and world regional efforts, the United States has moved to sup-
press terrorism through economic summits,65 domestic extradition trea-
ties,66 and new bilateral mutual judicial assistance treaties.67 More
specific efforts to create a codified domestic policy on terrorism preven-
tion include the Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
58 E.g. 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 5 (1986) (Tokyo Summit of 1986). The nations attending were:
The United States, Japan, United Kingdom, France, The Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium,
Italy, Canada and Luxemburg.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 1, 1986, at A7, cols. 1-2.
62 N.Y. Times, July 11, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
63 N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1986, at A4, col. 4. President Zia was not a party to the Tokyo summit.
64 Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 26, 1986, at Al, cols. 5-6.
65 Examples include the doctrines affirmed at the Bonn Declaration in 1978, 78 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 5 (1978); the Canadian Summit in 1981, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL. 16 (1981); the London Eco-
nomic Summit June 1984, 44 FACTS ON FILE 419 (1984); and the most recent Tokyo Summit in
1986, 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 5 (1986).
66 See Extradition Treaty, July 9, 1974, United States-Canada, 27 U.S.T. 983, T.I.A.S. No.
8237 (which includes extradition for hijacking, piracy, kidnappings, and bombings), Extradition
Treaty, May 4, 1978, United States-Mexico, 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656 (which also includes
as extraditable offenes kidnapping, piracy, offenses on transportation vehicles, offenses with
explosives).
67 Examples include but are not limited to:
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Hostage Taking,6" and the 1984 Anti-terrorism Assistance Program.69
The Hostage Taking Act would make a federal crime any activities of
individuals who seize Americans abroad.70 The Anti-terrorism Assist-
ance Program permits the President to furnish information to foreign
countries to enhance the ability of their law enforcement personnel to
deter terroristic actions.71
The Terrorist Prosecution Act of 198572 is another Congressional
effort to extend United States' jurisdiction to prosecute terrorists who
commit violent acts against United States citizens' abroad or in the
United States.73 In 1984, President Reagan introduced several bills to
specifically deal with the problems of state-sponsored terrorism.74 These
include the Aircraft Sabotage Act,75 Act for Rewards for Information
Concerning Terroristic Acts,76 and the Prohibition Against the Training
or Support of Terrorist Organizations Act of 1984."7 Of particular rele-
vance is the Prohibition Act which authorizes the Secretary of State to
suspend technology to groups supporting terrorists.78
In September of 1986, the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-
terrorism Act of 1986, was introduced to provide more protection for
embassies abroad.79 Although not yet fully effective, this Act would pro-
1. Supplementary Convention to the Extradition Convention of Oct. 24, 1961, Mar. 14, 1983,
United States-Sweden;
2. Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, July 17, 1984, United States-France,
T.I.A.S. No. 10823;
3. Extradition Treaty, July 18, 1984, United States-Thailand, T.S. No. 681;
4. Extradition Treaty, Aug. 17, 1984, United States-Costa Rica, T.S. No. 668;
5. Extradition Treaty, Aug. 17, 1984, United States-Jamaica, T.S. No. 849;
6. Extradition Treaty, Aug. 10, 1984, United States-Ireland, T.S. No. 391;
7. Extradition Treaty, Sept. 24, 1984, United States-Italy, T.I.A.S. No. 10837;
8. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters with Memorandum of Understand-
ing, Aug. 16, 1984, United States-Italy, 26 U.S.T. 493, T.I.A.S. No. 8052.
68 Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage Taking, 18 U.S.C. § 1203
(Supp. 11 1984) [hereinafter The Hostage Act].
69 Act of Nov. 14, 1983, 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa (Supp. 111984).
70 Hostage Act Supra note 68.
71 Act of Nov. 14, 1983 Supra note 69 (under "General Authority").
72 Terrorist Prosecution Act of 1985, § 1429, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 132 CONG. REc. §§ 1382-
88 (1986).
73 See note, US. Legislation to Prosecute Terrorists: Anti-Terrorists or Legalized Kidnapping,
18 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 915 (1985).
74 Current Developments, Leich Four Bills Proposed by President Reagan to Counter Terrorism,
78 AM. J. INT'L L. 915 (1985).
75 S. Res. 2623/H.R. 5690, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). See also The Hostage Act, supra note
68.
76 S. Res. 2625/H.R. 5612, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
77 S. Res. 2626/H.R. 5613, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
78 Current Developments supra note 74, at 923.
79 Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 7, 1986, at A25, col. 1.
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vide an estimated $2.1 billion for security operations.8 °
The efforts of the United States domestically indicate a willingness
by Congress to create stricter legislation to combat terrorism. However,
domestic legislation and international legislation have little meaning if
such measures cannot be enforced. Furthermore, international legisla-
tion as well as United States domestic legislation have been traditionally
directed at individuals and groups, not states who as a matter of foreign
policy ascribe to terrorism. Therefore, when evidence exists that another
state is preparing to take terrorist actions, must nations sit idlely and
take no action even in the absence of specific authorizing legislation? In
domestic criminal situations, a standard of probable cause must exist for
law enforcement to intercept criminal activity. What standard can be
used in the international community, especially where no preventive ac-
tion can be taken by a recognized international body to intercept such
activity? Given the limited scope of previous international legislation
and the lack of legal enforcement mechanisms, nations such as Israel,
and the United States, promote the idea of preemptive strikes against
terrorist bases. As stated by Harry H. Almond, Jr.:
"States that engage in terrorism, including attacking impermissible
targets, must be countered through reprisals because enforcement ma-
chinery for correcting such conduct is limiting." 81
Undoubtedly, with the United States' response to the Achille Lauro
incident, Libya and Pakistan, a new precedent is developing to utilize
military force against terrorists. The immediate questions raised by the
promulgation of such a policy are whether such a policy conforms to
international law; in what situations is the policy applicable; and whether
such a policy adds to stabilizing world order, or the deterioration of nor-
mative restraint in international affairs.82 The remaining sections evalu-
ate the United States' response to Libyan involvement with terrorism
under traditional theories of self-defense and related doctrines, as well as
the doctrine of reprisal.
III. CLAIMS OF SELF-DEFENSE
A. The Obligation of Pacific Settlement of Disputes
One fundamental tenet in the world legal order system is expressed
by Articles 2(3) and 33 of the United Nations Charter. The pacific settle-
80 Id.
81 Sayre, supra note 29, at 493.
82 Falk, The Decline of Normative Restraint in International Relations in SPECIAL FEATURE
RESTRAINTS ON THE UNILATERAL USE OF FORCE: A COLLOQUY, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 261, 265
(1985).
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ment of disputes.83 Article 2(3) requires nations to "settle their interna-
tional disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and justice, are not endangered." Article 33 requires nations in-
volved in international disputes to first seek a solution by acceptable
peaceful means such as negotiation.84 When read in conjunction with
one another, these articles contemplate a situation whereby nations
would attempt to resolve matters among themselves,85 and if this failed,
the matter would be referred to the Security Council, which bears the
primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security.86
Evidence indicating that the United States attempted to utilize the
Security Council before the bombing is scarce. If the United States in-
voked the authority of the Security Council on an emergency basis, and
no remedy came forth, the rule of reason would dictate that the United
States would have no choice but to strike preemptively. An attempt to
invoke the powers of the Security Council as a matter of policy would
also boost the credibility of subsequent actions.
Despite the requirements of all nations to attempt peaceful settle-
ment of disputes, neither Article 2(3) or Article 33 impairs the right of
self-defense under Article 51.87 Peaceful settlement of disputes does not
require nations to allow attacks against them to continue, if that nation
need exercise the right of self-defense, rather Articles 2(3) and 33 set
forth a general overriding obligation. 88 The problematical area in exer-
cising the right of self-defense is defining how much effort a nation must
take in the area of peaceful remedies.
83 See I BAsSIouNI AND NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 273-76
(1973).
84 U.N. CHARTER art. 33 provides in full:
"The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the mainte-
nance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation,
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies
or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."
85 G. GOODRICH & E. HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (2d ed. (1949). The
methods by which nations may attempt to resolve international disputes are: Negotiation (involving
diplomatic discussions); Enquiry (efforts to find a basis for settlement); Mediation (using an outside
agency to informally assist in resolution); Conciliation (a commission or other international body
attempts to intervene and settle); Arbitration (an international arbitration panel will hear the dispute
and decide it); Judicial Settlement (such as the International Court of Justice) resort to regional
agencies. Id. at 237-41. See H. Kelsen, Law of the United Nations 366, 924 (1951).
86 U.N. CHARTER art. 24 provides in full:
"In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer
on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility, the Security
Council acts on their behalf."
87 Arend, The Obligation to Pursue Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes During Hostil-
ities, 24 VA. J.INT'L L. 97, 122 (1983). See also Murphy, The Obligation of States to Settle Disputes
by Peaceful Means, 14 VA. J.INT'L L. 57 (1974).
88 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(3), 33.
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If nations claim a use of force as self-defense, they technically need
not have attempted to resolve the matter previously by peaceful means,
especially where the attack against them is unexpected. However, the
United States has overwhelmingly attempted to peacefully resolve the
problems of international state-sponsored terrorism, and has done so for
a significant time prior to the April 14, 1986 bombings.89
In addition to being a consistent participant in treaty making, and
diplomatic arrangements between world powers, 90 the United States has
attempted numerous peaceful methods of calling to Libya's attention the
unacceptability of their policy on terrorism. However, evidence available
to the public about United States efforts to negotiate with Qadhafi di-
rectly is nonexistent. Although, in the larger scope of the whole affair
such efforts may have proven fruitless, such a public "vain" attempt
would have only bolstered the credibility of the United States subsequent
actions.
Prior to the air strikes, the United States undertook diplomatic ef-
forts to avoid the situation. 91 According to newspaper accounts, the Na-
tional Security Council was initially interested in a peaceful resolution.92
In addition to the quiet diplomacy, public condemnation, and demon-
89 It should be noted that one other legal question arises with the bombings on April 14,
1986-that of Libya's rights to claim the Gulf of Sidra as their territorial waters, thereby excluding
nations from engaging in naval exercises such as the United States. Although the principal grounds
for the bombing of April 14, 1986, were to preempt terrorist bases, under Article 51 of the Charter
the prior exchanges of fire in late March were also argued as acts of self-defense under the Charter.
The scope of this paper is only whether the United States may assert claims of self-defense against
terrorism as a result of the April 14, 1986 bombings. It should be noted that the United States and
Libya have argued previously over the right to the Gulf of Sidra. See Note, The Gulf of Sidra
Incident of 1981, 10 YALE J. INT'L LAW 59 (1984). Other nations have as well. See also Libya v.
Malta Case, 44 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 341-5 (1983). Irrespective of the scope of this paper, a few words
must be said in passing. Customarily, nations have always had the right to operate vessels on the
high seas. The high seas are today regarded as areas beyond the territorial sea-which extends
outward three miles from the coast. United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980). See
also United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147 (11th Cir. 1985). Although various nations have
contended that 12 mile limits or 200 mile limits are territorial seas, no clear norm exists today to
confirm this. Furthermore, according to Professor Yehuda Blum, Libya's claim to the Gulf of Sidra
cannot be accommodated within the general international law of the sea. Blum, Current Develop-
ments, 80 AM. J. INT'L LAW 668, 671 (1986).
90 See sources listed, supra notes 43-82 and accompanying text.
91 Wash. Post, Apr. 15, 1986, at Al, col. 2. See also Waiters, supra note 13. It is suggested
that the most effective and useful method of dealing with international disputes is the method of
diplomacy. The likelihood of a quick decision and response is great, and both parties may be able to
compromise and effect a resolution. However, where one or both parties refuse to discuss the matter
among themselves, the matter must be referred to other parties by means of modification, arbitra-
tion, etc. The process takes great time to effectively resolve. It is suggested, however, that where
nations such as Libya who promulgate a policy of terrorism for years, refuse to negotiate diplomati-
cally, the likelihood of success at any other level is a nullity.
92 N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, at All, col. 1.
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strations of military force in the Gulf of Sidra,93 the United States urged
on January 7 and 8, 1986, an economic boycott and sanctions. 94
The United States, according to the Honorable Abraham D. Sofaer,
also approached other Arab states to negotiate with Colonel Qadhafi;
and requested East Germany to stop the attack on the Berlin nightclub
just minutes before it occurred.95
Therefore, despite numerous attempts to resolve the matter under
peaceful terms, no success was achieved. Accordingly, the decision to
utilize force under Article 51 of the Charter was carried out. The next
sections discuss this decision.
B. Prohibitions on the Use of Force Under the Charter
In the contemporary era, as reflected by the United Nations Char-
ter, nations are under a general obligation to refrain from using force
against other nations. Article 2(4) of the Charter is frequently cited by
international scholars as being the primary restriction on the use of
force.96 It provides:
"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations."
Article 2(4) was designed by the framers of the Charter for several
reasons. It was intended to ensure that international peace and security
would be maintained by nations, and to restrict war as a means of foreign
policy.9 7 Article 2(4) must not, however, be construed by itself to limit
all uses of force. The key language "or in any manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations" seems to imply the right of nations
to use force in limited circumstances so long as they conform to accepted
purposes of the Charter. 98 One central purpose of the United Nations is
clearly to maintain international peace and security, and to "take effec-
tive collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
93 Walters, supra note 13.
94 Wall St. J., Apr. 15, 1986, at 22, col. 2. Wall St. J., Apr. 16, 1986, at 18, col. 1.
95 Murphy, supra note 26, at 31.
96 See Nanda, The U.S. Armed Intervention in Grenada, Impact on World Order, 14 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 395, 417 (1984); Schwenninger, The 1980's: New Doctrines of Intervention or New
Norms of Non-Intervention, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 423, 427 (1981).
97 G. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO, & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, COMMEN-
TARY AND DOCUMENTS 44 (3d ed. 1969); HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN
POLICY 136 (1979).
98 G. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO, & A. SIMONS, Id.
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peace." 99 Although nations are forbidden to arbitrarily intervene milita-
rily in other nations' affairs, 1°° certain situations arise where nations have
no alternative but to use force. Unquestionably, the United States vio-
lated Libya's territorial integrity or political independence in the April
bombings, yet the question remains whether international law provides
exceptions to Article 2(4), and whether the United States' actions were
consistent with other provisions and purposes of the Charter.
C. Exceptions to the Prohibitions of the Use of Force in the
International Community
Where nations perceive threats to their peace and security, and
peaceful solutions are not imminently possible, nations may undertake
what are termed self-help measures to protect their formal legal rights. 10
The right of nationals to exercise self-help measures includes the right of
self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter, and limited intervention in
affairs to enforce legal norms." 2 Professor Brownlie has categorized the
exceptions to the restrictions on the use of force as follows:
1. acts of self-defense;
2. acts of collective self-defense;
3. actions authorized by a competent international organ;
4. where treaties confer rights to intervene by an ad hoc invitation, or
where consent is given by the territorial sovereign;
5. actions to terminate trespass;
6. necessity arising from natural catastrophe;
7. measures to protect the lives and or property of nationals in a foreign
territory.1 0 3
Under any circumstances, an analysis of self-help measures must
center around several factors: whether the action takes on a remedial or
repressive character to enforce legal rights,"° whether the force applied
99 U.N. CHARTER art. I(1) provides:
The purpose of the United Nations are:
1. "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the supervision of acts of
aggression or other breaches of peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with
the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of peace."
100 Schroder, Non-Intervention, Principle of, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 358 (1983); U.N. CHARTER art. 7.
101 Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325 (1967).
102 Bryde, Self-Help, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 215 (1983).
103 1. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 432, 433
(1963).
104 D. BowErr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (1956).
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supports the notions of basic community order, 10 and whether the force
has been applied in ways whose consequences conform to community
goals and minimal world order." 6 Relevant to an evaluation of the
United States' actions are the concepts of self-defense under Article 51 of
the Charter, and the protection of nationals abroad.
1. Self-defense under Article 51
Article 51 of the Charter provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
Undoubtedly Article 51 claims are evaluated by the world community,
especially through the United Nations,10 7 and all acts under Article 51
must be exercised exclusively for self-defense purposes. ° In the past,
international scholars have debated the question of "preemptive strikes,"
or "anticipatory self-defense," as being a concept consistent with Article
51.109 Anticipatory self-defense would permit a nation to use force to
eliminate a threatening attack before the attack actually occurred.110
Many international scholars, such as Professors Henkin,111 Jessup, 112
Brownlie,1 13 and Kunz,114 have contended that such a concept is con-
trary to the scope of Article 51, because an actual "armed attack" need
not occur for a nation to employ force. The concern over restricting the
concept of anticipatory self-defense is that nations may abuse the doc-
105 Reisman, Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L.
279 (1985).
106 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 103, at 432, 433.
107 P. JEssup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 168 (1949).
108 D. BOWETr, supra note 104, at 269.
109 M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 231, 232
(1961).
110 Id.
Ill Schroder, supra note 100, at 232-33.
112 M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 109, at 165-66.
113 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 103, at 225-226, 434.
114 Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense under Article 51 of the UN. Charter, 41 AM.
J.INT'L L. 872, 876 (1947).
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trine and disguise acts of aggression as self-defense. 115
Other noted scholars such as Professor Bowett, 116 McDougal" 7 and
Waldcock118 have acknowledged the validity of the concept of anticipa-
tory self-defense pending certain requirements. Recently, nations such as
the United States and Israel have advocated the desirability of the doc-
trine, especially in the area of responding to terrorists.11 9
a. Anticipatory self-defense
Although the accepted interpretation of "armed attack" under Arti-
cle 51 remains in dispute, nations such as the United States and Israel
have over the past few years begun to evolve a state practice of preemp-
tive force.' 20
Tribunals in the past have acknowledged the rights of nations to
respond preemptively to threats of impending attacks. 121 Professor
Schachter has contended that based on previous customary international
law advanced by tribunals, and state practice, that terrorist activities
against a state's nationals, especially hostage situations, should be an area
where this doctrine may apply. 12 2 In any circumstances, though, the ele-
ments of necessity and proportionality need to be present to allow a state
to legitimately claim a preemptive strike as being self-defense.123 Neces-
sity has been described as a temporal requirement, involving responding
close in time to the impending threat.124 Proportionality is the measure-
ment of the threatening attack or attack against the force used to repel or
115 Schwarzenberger, Fundamental Principle of International Law, 87 HAGUE RECUEIL DEs
COURS 195, 334 (1955).
116 p. JEssup, supra note 107, at 187-88.
117 M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 109, at 233-36; McDougal, The Soviet Cuban
Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597, 599 (1963).
118 Waldcock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81
HAGUE RECUEIL DEs COURS 455, 495-97 (Vol. II, 1952).
119 Randelzhofe, Use of Force, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 265,
267 (1983).
120 For example, the United States' actions in bombing Libya, responding to the Achille Lauro
hijacking are arguably acts of anticipatory self-defense. When Israel bombarded Tunis in October,
1985, they claimed the right of self-defense to preempt P.L.O. headquarters, and bases. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 2, 1985, at Al, col. 6. The United States stated that the attack by Israel was justified due to a
recent terrorist incident. Id. at Al, col. 5. Other incidents of Israel preemptively striking bases
included: November 17, 1986-Israel gunships bombarded Palestinian bases in Sidon, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 18, 1986, at Al, col. 3; October 28, 1985-Israel Air Force jets attacked P.L.O. bases in Bekaa
region of Lebanon. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
121 II, G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW As APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURT AND TRIBUNALS 29 (1968) (citing the Tokyo Military Tribunal).
122 Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 113,
133 (1986).
123 Wallace, International Law and the Use of Force, 19 INT'L LAW 259, 262 (1985).
124 Schachter, supra note 122, at 132; see generally B. RODICK, THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1928).
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deter future action by the threatening state. 125
The case often cited as the locus classicus of the doctrine of anticipa-
tory self-defense is The Caroline.'26 In 1837, a rebellion in colonial Can-
ada was supported by American volunteers operating in the United
States. 127 The Caroline was a steamship supplying men and provisions to
Canadian rebels.128 Because the rebels attacked British vessels, and Brit-
ish protests about the activities remained unredressed, a British military
force stormed the vessel, and two men were killed.'2 9 American Secre-
tary of State Daniel Webster, responding to the incidents, stated that the
doctrine applies where dangers are "instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."' 30 Since the Caroline
incident, nations have argued the doctrine in situations such as the
United States' response to the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962,131 the inva-
sion of Manchuria by Japan in 1933,132 and the invasion of Norway by
the Nazis in 1940.133
In June of 1981, Israeli planes destroyed the Osirak reactor just
outside of Baghdad, Iraq.134 The principle reason that Israel advanced
for preemptively striking was the Iraqi purpose in building the reactor:
to produce nuclear arms to be potentially used against Israel. 135 Another
reason for the strike was Iraq's support for Palestinian terrorism in the
Middle East. 136 Israel invoked the inherent right of self-defense under
the Charter as permitting the strike to prevent the potential threat.
37
Although Israel's actions were criticized by nations including the United
125 Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1637 (1984).
126 Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM.J.INT'L L. 82 (1938).
127 Meng, The Caroline, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 81 (1983).
128 Id.
129 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-14 (1906).
130 Letter from D. Webster to Fox, reprinted in 29 BRIT. AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1129,
1138 (184041).
131 Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade on Quarantine-Interdiction: National and Collective
Defense Claims Valid Under International Law, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REv 335 (1963). Here the
United States claimed that the Navy blockade was necessary because of the imminent threat of
installation of missile sites in Cuba.
132 II L. OPPENHEIM INTERNATIONAL LAW 302 (Lauterpacht, 7th ed. 1955), where the claim
by Japan that they had to invade Manchuria due to Chinese attacks was rejected because no immi-
nent threat existed.
133 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Nuremberg) Opinion and Judgment, 36 (1947). Similiar
to Japan, Germany argued the necessity of the invasion and this claim was also rejected by the
Military Tribunal.
134 N.Y. Times, June 9, 1981, at Al, col. 6.
135 GOV'T OF ISRAEL, THE IRAQI THREAT-WHY ISRAEL HAD TO ACT 9 (Jerusalem 1981).
136 Id. at 6. See Mallison and Mallison, The IsraeliAerial Attack of June 7, 1981, Upon Iraq's
Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defense, 15 VAND. J. INT'L LAW 417 (1984).
137 GOV'T OF ISRAEL, supra note 136, at 37-42.
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States 3 8 and scholars, 139 general support existed for the action.14
Israel has also advanced claims under theories of anticipatory self-
defense for the occupation of Lebanon.141 And, in October of 1985,
Israel claimed the right of self-defense when it bombed the Palestinian
Liberation Organization's General Compound Headquarters in Tunis, in
which over sixty were killed. 142 Israel claimed the attack was a warning
to terrorists.'4 3 The United States supported the attack.'"
In evaluating such claims, under the standards advanced by the Car-
oline scholars have contended that the test should be "whether a nation
acted with 'reasonableness under the circumstances.' "145 According to
Professor Schachter, the test of the Caroline is still applicable to modem
day situations.' 46 In terms of the United States' response to Libyan ter-
rorism, an imminence of threat did exist. It is uncontroverted that Libya
is heavily involved in sponsoring international terrorism. 4 7 Colonel
Qadhafi has vowed publicly to utilize terrorist tactics against the United
States.148 U.S. intelligence sources have linked Libya to numerous inci-
dents in 1986, before the bombing of the Berlin nightclub. 149 Then, after
the April bombing in Berlin, clear and convincing evidence linked Libya
to the incident.' 50 Following the Berlin bombing, other evidence indi-
cated future plans to link Libya with potential future attacks in Vi-
enna. 5' Therefore, intelligence information available on or about April
14, 1986, which had proven consistently reliable in the past indicated
further attacks.
The dilemma which international law faces in such a situation con-
cerns the definition of "imminence." Should imminence mean immedi-
ate, as in the next few minutes, or several days later? With modern
138 N.Y. Times, June 18, 1981, at Al, col. 1, where the United States and Iraq agreed to
condemn the attack by Israel.
139 Mallison & Mallison, supra note 136; see D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike Upon the Iraq Nu-
clear Reactor, 77 AM. J. INT'L LAW 584 (1983).
140 See Note, Tensions Between International Law and Strategic Security: Implication of
Israel's Preemptive Raid on Iraq's Nuclear Reactor, 24 VA. J. INT'L LAW 459 (1984); see also Note,
Attack on Osirak Delimitation or Self-Defense Under International Law, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L
AND COMP. L. 131 (1982).
141 See Levenfeld, Israel's Counter-Feedayeen Tactics in Lebanon, Self-Defense and Reprisal
Under Modern International Law, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. (1982).
142 N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
143 Id. at A8, col. 1.
144 Id. at Al, col. 5.
145 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 121, at 34.
146 Schachter, supra, note 122 at 136.
147 See sources listed, supra notes 5, 6, 13 and 14.
148 See sources listed, supra note 21.
149 See sources listed, supra notes 13, 14 and 15.
150 See sources listed, supra note 13.
151 See sources listed, supra note 14.
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technology and communications systems, and the capabilities of modem
diplomatic correspondences, if a matter of several hours or days lies be-
tween a suspected threat or action, perhaps the threat is not so imminent
as to require a response of force. Again, the tool of a direct public appeal
to Qadhafi to cease the illegal terrorist activity would only create mass
opinion against him should he ignore such a request. Therefore, all na-
tions who invoke the imminence standard should be careful to explicate
the actual time frames involved.
With respect to the proportionality requirement, another difficulty
arises under international law to create a workable and measurable stan-
dard. Does the Biblical standard an "eye for an eye"apply, or should the
standard be an approximation to the threat? If the reason given for the
U.S. bombings was the Berlin incident in April, where one building was
destroyed, 2 persons killed, and several hundred wounded, do the thirty
dead, one hundred injured, and destruction of several buildings reflect a
proportionate standard?152 Even though the Security Council criticized
the number of civilian casualties,153 it would appear that the United
States made every effort to minimize the civilian casualties, and only
strike at suspected terrorist strongholds. Also, the relative number of
casualties, and weaponry including conventional bombs, was not in great
excess of the provocation or threat. 154 Furthermore, Ambassador Wal-
ters reported the action to the Security Council in no uncertain terms as
being one of self-defense. 55 President Reagan and the National Security
Council were also reported to have deliberately considered the concept of
proportionality, and a military plan was organized accordingly.156 Given
the actual result of the aerial strikes, and all available evidence, it cannot
be said that the United States acted inconsistently with the requirements
of preemptive force in that the relative casualties and weaponry were
proportionate to the threat. According to Ambassador Robert B.
Oakley, a sharp decline in Libyan-sponsored terrorism occured and other
nations focused on the problems of Libyan terrorism and moved swiftly
to take steps in prevention of future attacks. 157
However, the international community still needs a standard to ade-
quately define proportionality. The best standard should require that in
all circumstances only the individuals and technology involved in illegal
activity be targeted.
Under all circumstances, nations who decide that a strategic deploy-
ment of force is necessary must be cognizant that such uses of force are
152 Whitaker, supra note 4.
153 1986 DEP'T ST. BULL. 21-23 (Apr. 24).
154 Id.
155 Id. at 21.
156 Newsweek, Apr. 21, 1986, at 21-22.
157 Murphy, supra note 26, at 45.
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not repressive, nor acts of aggression disguised as self-defense. The
claims of self-defense under modem international law can best be made
when time elements of threats are clearly set forth, and all direct at-
tempts to negotiate with the source of the threat are exhausted.
b. Protection of nationals abroad
United Nations Ambassador Vernon Walters averred that the U.S.'s
action was also undertaken to protect American citizens living abroad.158
Obvious concern by the United States included the safety of U.S. diplo-
mats abroad, private citizens and military personnel as were in the Berlin
nightclub, and other Americans in foreign countries, especially Europe.
The doctrine of protection of nationals abroad existed before the Charter,
and is essentially a specific type of self-help falling under the general
claim of self-defense. 59 Under one view, an injury to a national in a
foreign state, such as the injuries sustained by U.S. citizens during the
Berlin bombing, are imputed injuries to the nationals home state. 6° Pro-
fessor Bowett has previously noted that:
"There may be occasions when the threat of danger is great enough, in
its application to a sizable community abroad, for it to be legitimately
construed as an attack on the state itself."' 16 1
Therefore, under the social contract theory, a nation is obligated to take
all measures possible to protect its citizens abroad. 62 In the pre-charter
era, the United States has frequently exercised the right to protect na-
tionals,163 and Israel has claimed this right by its military maneuvers and
occupation of Lebanon. 164 Since the Entebbe incident in July of 1976,165
approximately ten military rescue efforts have been undertaken by vari-
ous governments to free hostages abroad. 6 6 However, the bombing of
Libya was the first effort by the United States to launch a "non-rescue
raid" military response where targets were destroyed in an attempt to
deter attacks against U.S. citizens in foreign countries. Although inter-
national jurists have recognized the right of nations to intervene in other
158 DEP'T ST. BULL., supra note 153, at 21.
159 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 103, at 225, 292.
160 Bowett, The Use of Force in the Protection of Nationals, 43 TRANS. CROT. SOC'Y 111, 117
(1952).
161 D. BowEI'r, supra note 104, at 93.
162 Id. at 91.
163 Id. at 97.
164 See sources listed, supra note 141.
165 See Boyle, The Entebbe Hostage Crisis reprinted in T.P.V.W.O., supra note 29, at 559. Af-
ter Air France Flight 139 from Tel Aviv to Paris was hijacked by individuals claiming to be mem-
bers of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, on July 3, 1976, Israeli military forces
undertook a military raid.
166 The most recent raid was undertaken by Pakistan commandos in early September, 1986.
See N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1985, at A10, col. 3.
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nations' affairs on behalf of their nationals,'67 certain conditions must
exist. Professors Waldcock and Bowett contend:
1. an imminent threat of injury to nationals must exist;
2. a failure or inability on the part of the territorial sovereign to protect
them; and
3. the measure of protection should be strictly confined to the object of
protecting them against injury.16
States employing such a force to protect nationals must always re-
spond on a limited and temporary basis, and proportionally.'69 In the
past, nations have at times disguised an act of aggression as the right to
protect nationals abroad, when no real danger to nationals existed. 170
However, no clear prohibition against this use of force presently exists in
the international community. 171
It is the author's view that this doctrine is most applicable where a
nation exercises force to rescue hostages or to remove nationals from for-
eign countries, such as the United States' Operation Bluelight effort in
Iran.172 However, a general claim may be made as a result of the bomb-
ing of Libya under the theory that no nation can totally protect persons
from terrorist attacks. It is undisputed United States citizens abroad are
constant victims of terrorist attacks and are relatively easy prey. 173 Intel-
ligence sources revealed that U.S. diplomats were being monitored by
Libyans. 174 Libya has been linked to international terrorism on numer-
ous occasions. 17 The international community to this day has not been
able to thwart terrorist attacks, although great success has been achieved
in foiling terrorist plans. Just prior to the Berlin bombing, the United
States tried to persuade other Arab nations and East Germany to prevent
the bombing. 176 After the bombing, intelligence sources noted the reaffir-
167 p. JEssup, supra note 107, at 169; 1 L. OPPENHEIM INTERNATIONAL LAW, § 135 at 309
(8th ed. 1955); Waldcock, supra note 118, at 445.
168 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 103, at 299. See 12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, § 5 at 187, 189 (1971).
169 Abramansky & Green, Unilateral Intervention on Behalf of Hijacked Americans Abroad,
1979 UTAH L. REV. 231.
170 D. BowEr, supra note 160, at 104.
171 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran) 1980 I.C.J. 17 (May
12, 1981). See also Jeffrey, The American Hostages in Tehran: The IC.J. and the Legality of Rescue
Missions, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 717 (1980) and Note, Resort to Force by States to Protect Nationals:
The United States Rescue Mission to Iran and its Legality Under International Law, 21 VA. J. INT'L
L. 485 (1981).
172 Id.
173 N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1985, at Al, col. 5, (indicating that American citizens and property
comprise 30-35% of international targets). See also Terror in 1985: Brutal Attacks, Tough Response,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1985, at Al, col. 5.
174 See sources listed, supra notes 14, 15.
175 See sources listed, supra notes 10, 11, 13-15, 21 and 30.
176 See sources listed, supra notes 91-95.
1987]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
mation by Libya to continue its attacks.1 77 Therefore, based on the im-
minent threat of continued attacks, the inability of other nations to assist
and prevent the attacks, and the stated sole objective of destroying areas
considered terrorist strongholds, the United States can also validly claim
the right to exercise force on behalf of nationals in response to terrorist
activities, but such force must not serve as a reprisal.17 The following
section discusses the United States' actions under the doctrine of reprisal.
IV. CLAIMS OF REPRISAL
Although the principle claim by the United States to exercise force
was self-defense, the United States prior to the bombing had indicated
acceptance to the idea of retaliation against terrorists.1 79 Immediately
prior to the bombing of Libya, the idea of "retaliatory strikes" was dis-
cussed by the National Security Council, 1 0 and President Reagan stated
on one occasion that he ordered the strikes in "retaliation" for the bomb-
ing of the Berlin nightclub." 1 The use of the language "retaliation" and
the actual attack itself raises several questions: Whether the United
States actions operated primarily as a reprisal, and if it did, whether such
action is consistent with international law?
A. Pre-Charter Reprisals
Reprisals have been defined as injurious and otherwise internation-
ally illegal acts of one state against another, and are exceptionally permit-
ted for the purpose of compelling the latter state to consent to a
satisfactory settlement created by its own international delinquency. 8 2
In the Middle Ages, the word reprisal stemmed from the French repren-
dre (to take) and were permitted by any member of a group offended by
an act of another sovereign, against any subject of that sovereign who
committed a wrong or failed to pay a debt.183 Naturally, a fine line may
exist between acts of reprisal and acts of self-defense. Traditionally, acts
of self-defense attempt to eliminate an immediate threat or to prevent
instantly a threat from occurring,18 4 while reprisals attempt to meet un-
177 See sources listed, supra note 14.
178 Schachter, supra note 122, at 139.
179 E.g., when Israel attacked Tunis in early October of 1985, in "retaliation for the slaying of
three Israeli's in Larnaca, Cyprus," the United States stated the attacks were justified against ter-
rorists. N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1985, at Al, cols. 5, 6. On December 30, 1985, the United States also
indicated agreements with Israel as a matter of policy on utilizing reprisals against terrorists. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 30, 1985, at A7, col. 1.
180 N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
181 N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, at Al, cols. 3-6.
182 II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 133, at 136.
183 I B. FERENCZ, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW: A WAY TO WORLD PEACE, 4 (1983).
184 10 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 338 (1971).
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lawful acts already performed, by way of punitive sanction."8 5 While
both acts of self-defense and reprisal attempt to deter future actions by
another sovereign, reprisals tend to occur much later in time as a re-
sponse to an act, and have no relationship to pending threats. Reprisals
occur in situations whereby states believe the laws regulating conduct
among states are so inadequate, that the only method of resolution of a
conflict is by means which may be considered illegal.'" 6 Situations in
which reprisals occur include state actions against foreigners which are
illegal; a state's refusal to compensate foreigners for damages during civil
strife, and a state's failure to fulfill treaty obligations.' 87 Reprisals can
occur between nations in peacetime,18 8 or can originate between nations
at war when one nation violates the laws of warfare.' 8 9 Reprisals are
classified as "positive," involving overt action by one nation against an-
other, or "negative," involving a refusal by one nation to do what is
required.' 90
Currently the prevailing view is that reprisals are illegal under the
United Nations Charter. 19' Yet the minority view in the past, coupled
with ambiquous United Nations declarations, creates a situation whereby
nations may believe they have a right to resort to reprisals.
The United States in the past has employed acts of reprisal. 92 The
Naulilaa case is often cited as the leading case in evaluating reprisals.'9 3
When two members of a German armed party were killed by Portugese
soldiers on Portugese territory, German troops subsequently attacked
and destroyed several Portugese forts and posts.194 In declaring reprisals
"acts of self-help by the injured state in retaliation for unredressed acts
contrary to international law,"' 95 the Tribunal formulated conditions for
legitimate reprisals to be exercised:
1. a prior illegal act by a nation;
2. an unsuccessful attempt to obtain redress for the alleged international
wrong; and
185 Id.
186 T. COLBERT, RETALIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 60 (1948).
187 Id. at 64.
188 Lohr, Legal Analysis of United States Military Response to State Sponsored International
Terrorism, 34 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 27 (1985).
189 KALSHOVEN, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 321 (1983).
190 Lohr, supra note 188, at 30.
191 Schachter, supra note 122, at 132. Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recource to Armed Force, 66
AM. J. INT'L L. 33-36 (1972).
192 Lohr, supra note 188, at 29, where that author cites the bombing in 1853 by U.S. Naval
vessels of Greytown, Nicaragua in retaliation for wrongs against U.S. citizens in that town.
193 Naulilaa Case (Ger. v. Pol.) 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1011 (1928).
194 Schwazenberg, The Law of Armed Conflict, in II INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 49 (1968).
195 Id.
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3. a proportionate response by the injured nation. 196
B. Post Charter Reprisals
Since the Naulilaa incident, reprisals in general have been con-
demned.1 9v On December 28, 1968, when Israel staged a helicopter as-
sault on the Beruit airport, in retaliation for an Arab attack on the El-Al
airline on December 26th, the Security Council vigorously condemned
the act. 198 The action by Israel was a direct response to terrorist attacks
against Israel, which Lebanon refused to prevent.199 In commenting on
the Israeli actions, Professor Falk believed the action to be illegal,
although he provided a twelve point framework to evaluate reprisal
claims, implying that if nations adhered to the requirement of the Nauli-
laa case, acts of reprisal become more legitimate.20 °
In 1970, the United Nations Declaration of Friendly Relations spe-
cifically required states to refrain from the use of reprisals.2 °1 Yet evi-
dence exists that a limited number of states accept the validity of
reasonable reprisals.20 2
The actions by the United States in the broadest sense operated as a
reprisal, in addition to possible self-defense claims. Libya's prior illegal
acts were principally its role in the Berlin bombing, as well as other ter-
rorist incidents. It cannot be said that the United States did not try to
peacefully resolve the situation, due to numerous efforts in international
convention, appeals to Arab neighbors, and other diplomatic means. But
for the evidence linking Libya to future attacks in Vienna, the strikes
would appear to operate as a reprisal. They were specifically designed to
deter future terrorist activity by Libya, but may have operated as retribu-
tion as well.
Nations such as the United States must attempt to avoid a situation
whereby a use of force in peacetime even appears as a reprisal. Given the
consistent condemnation of reprisals in the international community, the
only valid use of preemptory force falls under the claim of self-defense.
"Retaliation" and "reprisal" tend to be tainted with notions of fostering
196 Id. at 50. 12 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 177 (1968).
197 P. JEssuP, supra note 107, at 178; D. BOWETT, supra note 104, at 13; I. BROWNLIE, supra
note 103, at 222, 223.
198 Falk, The Beruit Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 415,
417 (1969).
199 Id. at 422.
200 Id. at 439. See Bowett, supra note 191, at 27.
201 United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions Among States, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (1970).
202 Comment, International Legal and Policy Implications of an American Counter Terrorist
Strategy, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 219 (1984).
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aggression, and as such, do not seem consistent with maintaining interna-
tional peace and security.
C. Proportionality and Civilian Casualties Due to Reprisals
The question of the proportionality of the response is raised by vir-
tue of the number of civilian casualties. The strike was technically exe-
cuted during peacetime. One school of thought calls terrorism a form of
warfare. If the United States responded militarily, would the legal situa-
tion as to civilian casualties be treated differently because the laws of war
apply?
Several scholars contend the law of warfare has no applicability to
terrorism. 20 3 However, the United States, exercising a claim of reprisal
in peace or wartime, is bound by the Geneva Conventions,2° as reprisal
attacks against civilians in any form are clearly illegal.20 5 The 1949 Ge-
neva Convention on the Protection of Civilians specifically would apply
to all cases of armed conflict irrespective of whether a state of war was
not recognized by the parties.206 It forbids reprisals against civilians. 207
Protocol I, additional to the Geneva Convention, formulated in
1977, requires states to distinguish between civilians and combatants,
and civilians and military objectives.208 Protocol I applies to any land,
air or sea warfare which may affect civilian populations.20 9 Indiscrimi-
nate attacks are expressly prohibited, and are defined as:
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be
directed at a specific military objective; or
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of
which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol. 210
203 Green & Lador-Lederer, International Terrorism: Fourth Interim Report of the Committee
LL.A. in 7 TERRORISM: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 127 (1984). See Rubin, Terrorism and the
Laws of War, 12 DEN. J. INT'L LAW & POL. 219 (1984).
204 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362. Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363. Geneva Convention Relative to Treatment of P.O.W.'s,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3265.
205 Draper, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 324 (1983). Dinstein, id.
at 338, 341.
206 See Protection of War Victims, Aug. 12, 1949, Part I, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518, T.I.A.S.
No. 3365.
207 Id.
208 Protocol I, Additional to the Geneva Convention 1977, reprinted in D. SCHINDLER & J.
TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 580, art. 48 (1981).
209 Id. at art. 49(3).
210 Id. at art 51(4).
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Nations are further forbidden from treating as a single military objective
clearly separated and distinct military objectives located where civilians
are concentrated a.2 1  Attacks which may be expected to cause incidental
loss of civilian life, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated, are prohibited as well. 12 Fur-
thermore, nations are directed to take precautionary measures, before an
attack, including verification of military objectives and minimizing inci-
dental loss of civilian life. 1 3 Overall, Protocol I requires nations to take
the utmost precautions when civilian casualties may result from a strate-
gic bombing.214
Given the evidence available to the public, the United States did
adhere in procedure and form to the concept of proportionality and mini-
mal loss of civilian life. The attacks were against specific military loca-
tions and bases where terrorists were believed to operate. Careful
deliberation as to the scope of the attacks was made.2 1  The attacks were
on target with minor deviations. No other targets other than the bases
were military objectives. The fact that civilians were affected incidentally
to the bombing does not render a violation of the Geneva Conventions.
Where approximately thirty-seven dead have been reported, and over
ninety injured, such a result is not inconsistent with the rule of propor-
tionality and the reasonable protection of civilians. Furthermore, the
primary motivation behind the attacks, in addition to protecting U.S. cit-
izens abroad, was to force Libya to withdraw from promoting and spon-
soring terrorist activities.216 The bombings were executed solely as a
response to the illegal actions of Libya, and not out of a policy of aggres-
sion.217 Irrespective of the motivation behind utilizing military force to
respond to terrorists, the question of the desirability of reprisals in light
of long term world and short term world community goals remains unan-
swered. If nations are permitted to engage in terrorist activities without
any means to enforce international prohibition thereof, state conduct
may be unregulated and a continued rise in incidents may occur. On the
other side, if nations consistently employ reprisal type actions, long term
stability may be jeopardized, and greater conflict may emerge. And with
the increasing ease by which nations may acquire nuclear weapon tech-
nology, should terrorists seize upon this avenue, grave world chaos could
occur. Nations should avoid the necessity of resorting to reprisals, and
211 Id. at art. 51(5)(a).
212 Id. at art. 51(5)(b).
213 Id. at art. 57.
214 See Gasser, A Brief Analysis of the 1977 General Protocols, 19 AKRON L. REv. 521, 526
(1986) (Symposium on the 1977 Geneva Protocols).
215 See sources listed, supra notes 1-23, 90-95.
216 T. COLBERT, supra note 186, at 160.
217 Id.
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adhere to uses of force under claims of self-defense. The remaining sec-
tion discusses the options available in the modem era.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECT
The solution to the question of terrorism does not lie in one avenue
or approach, but is manyfold. As to the desirability of military responses
to terrorist activities, clear procedures and policy goals must be estab-
lished by nations desiring to exercise this avenue. The idea of a reprisal,
given the instability of certain regions of the world, is antithetical to min-
imum world order. Despite the short term gains of such an act, the long
term gain appears not to be deterrence, but further instigation. However,
if nations choose to claim the right of retaliation, it must only be under-
taken where no other avenue of redress can be attained. All diplomatic
efforts must be exhausted, as well as appeals to international bodies.
Where nations such as Libya choose to exercise such lawlessness as to
attack innocent civilians, nations such as the United States may have no
other feasible option with which to respond. When and if all peaceful
means are exhausted, if a nation chooses to act in retaliation, with the
goal of enforcing international law and deterring future illegal acts, the
chosen targets must be verifiably connected with the illegal activity, they
must be virtually free of a civilian presence, and the response must be
proportionate to the alleged injury. Although the United States' actions
in Libya operated in self-defense, a general claim of reprisal could be
made. Such a claim, though, is at the least questionable as a valid doc-
trine of international law. The real international dilemma which cur-
rently exists is that nations such as the United States have no choice but
to resort to such actions. Only when the world community as a whole
seeks to condemn and limit acts of terrorism will the situation be
remedied.
Nations which exercise military force in self-defense must also pos-
sess valid evidence that an impending attack is present, that peaceful
remedies are not possible, and that the impending attack will cause much
destruction if it is carried out. Nations must always respond proportion-
ately to the impending threat, and seek to minimize all damage while
maximizing protection. Should other nations be unable to protect for-
eign nationals within their bodies, pre-planning crisis management teams
should be on the ready alert. This contemplates foreign nations agreeing
to work jointly with the rescuing nation, the sharing and pooling of re-
sources, and much time and training.
The effective and well balanced military response will always depend
on reliable and extensive intelligence networks. Representatives from
governments must regularly meet and share intelligence information on
an increased and continual basis. Given the current state of international
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law and the fact that many nations tend to ignore it, the intelligence area
becomes the vital link between stability and instability. Nations must
refine and increase intelligence sources from a wide variety of areas to
effectively deal with terrorists who tend to be extremely sophisticated in
intelligence gathering themselves.
Nations should contemplate the desirability of making terrorism
both a domestic and international crime, permitting law enforcement
universal jurisdiction in terrorist activities. Examples of nations taking
positive steps in cooperating jurisdictionally occured when Britain seized
a woman carrying a bomb on board an El-Al airplane in London,218 and
when West German police recently apprehended suspected persons in
the Achille Lauro affair.2 19
The previous ineffectiveness of international legal machinery does
not mean that the legal frameworks cannot be strengthened. Recent ex-
amples of positive legal steps in combating terrorism are the convictions
of terrorists in Italy220 and Britain.22 ' Due to the sensitive issues raised
by terrorism, a special tribunal should be founded to adjudge terrorist
actions. Such a tribunal should operate under a mandate which permits
special investigation and access to classified information if necessary.
However, it is unlikely that countries could ever agree to such a panel,
given the previous disagreements with the international court of justice
and its jurisdiction.
Finally, nations should move to create a convention deploring all
bombings, and extend protections under such law to all persons affected,
not just diplomats.
The current status of international law creates a situation whereby
nations must resort to military force to deal with terrorists. Until states
who illegally sponsor terrorists relinquish their support of terrorism and
abandon it as a means of foreign policy, the world community will see an
increase in strategic attacks and disorder.
218 Dickey, Linking Syria to Terrorism, Newsweek, Nov. 3, 1986, at 40. The seizure of the
woman uncovered a Syrian plot to bomb the plane. A Jordanian was eventually convicted of being
involved.
219 Philadephia Inquirer, Aug. 1, 1986, at A7, cols. 1-2.
220 N.Y. Times, July 11, 1986, at Al, col. 4.
221 Newsweek, supra note 218.
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